The Securities and Exchange Commission\u27s Ban on Legal Servicees by Audit Firms: Amendments to Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by Mijares, Alison H.
The Securities and Exchange
Commission's Ban on Legal Services by
Audit Firms: Amendments to Rule 2-01
of Regulation S-X Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
By ALISON H. MIJAREs*
IT IS THE DUTY of auditors' to present an unbiased financial por-
trait of a company and its assets. Every day millions of people are in-
duced to invest their money based upon the reports of independent
auditors and their firms. 2 These reports and financial statements have
historically been accurate and reliable, thereby providing insight into
the functioning of a company. As such, they often serve as a basis for
deciding whether to invest money in a specific company. The public's
reliance on the accounting profession stems from the fact that the
accounting practices used in preparing these statements are standard-
ized and highly regulated. 3
Unlike the objective auditor, the traditional role of lawyers is to
represent their clients, render advice on legal and non-legal issues,
and occasionally litigate. When practicing in an accounting firm, a
lawyer's practice area may include any of the following: tax, corporate,
securities, employment, employee benefits, and other business-related
fields.4 Additionally, attorneys practicing in accounting and auditing
* Class of 2002. The Author would like to thank her parents, Ernest and Patti, for all
of their love and support. She would also like to thank the. entire USF Law Review Staff for
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1. For the purpose of this Comment, the terms "auditor" and "accountant" will be
used interchangeably. Generally, an accountant prepares the documents which the auditor
then checks; but they are similar in that they communicate using the same lexicon.
2. See Proposed Rule: Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Require-
ments, Release No. 33,7870 (proposed June 27, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/
rules/proposed/34-42994.htm [hereinafter Release No. 33,7870].
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aa(25)-(26) (1994); 17 CFR § 210.10-01(d) (1994).
4. See Peter C. Kostant, Paradigm Regained: How Competition from Accounting Firms May
Help Corporate A ttorneys to Recapture the Ethical High Ground, 20 PACE L. REv. 43, 48 (1999); see
also Ward Bower, The Case for MDPs: Should Multidisciplinary Practices Be Banned or Embraced?,
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firms may provide ,litigation support, case valuation, investigation, and
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") .5 By attempting to convince
both professions that they cannot work in the same firm and leaving
them to defend the virtues of their respective careers, the Securities
and Exchange Commission's ("SEC" or "the Commission") new rule
proscribing legal services has strained the relationship between law-
yers and auditors.
The Securities and Exchange Commission was created in 1934 in
the wake of the Great Depression in order to enforce the Securities
Act of 19336 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .7 The two com-
mon sense principles on which the Acts are premised are: (1) compa-
nies offering securities must be truthful in the information they
provide the public; and (2) sellers of securities, i.e., brokers, dealers,
and exchanges, must also be truthful.8 The SEC's primary purposes
are to promote disclosure of material financial information, enforce
securities regulations, and protect investors.9 As a means of achieving
these goals, the SEC requires that all companies with an excess of $10
million in assets and securities held by more than 500 owners file an-
nual and other periodic reports, such as yearly financial audits.' 0
These yearly financial audits are conducted by accounting firms that
are expected to provide reasonable assurance that the client com-
pany's records are not materially misleading. Audits must be prepared
in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP").I Ij To ensure audits are reliable, the SEC also requires that
LAW PRAc. MGMT. MAG. (Jul./Aug. 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm/maga-
zine/mdp-bowe995.html.
5. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 48.
6. See The SEC: Who We Are, What We Do, available at http://www.sec.gov/asec/www-
sec.htm (last modified Aug. 8, 2000).
7. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-7811 (1994). The Securities Act of 1933 is also known as the
"truth in securities" act. See also The SEC: Who We Are, What We Do, supra note 6. The Act of
1934 gives broad authority to the SEC over all aspects of the securities industry. See id.
8. See The SEC: Who We Are, What We Do, supra note 6.
9. See id.
10. See id. An audit is the "verification or examination of financial accountants or
records" to check their accuracy. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 143 (1994).
11. The financial statements reviewed in audits are the client company's responsibility
to prepare. In general, an auditor reviews the financial statements, examining both the
balance sheet (showing assets, liabilities and equity) and the income statements (revealing
revenues and expenses). See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *3. There are several
methods for the auditor to examine the company's financial information, but it is usually
done on a test basis or sample basis. See id. Then the auditor provides a written opinion on
the company's financial statements and disclosures, determining if the records are materi-
ally misleading or comply with CAAP. See id.
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the individuals who prepare the audits be independent of the com-
pany being audited.' 2
To ensure independence, auditors are subject to the authority of
two governing bodies. The first is the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants ("AICPA"), which is concerned with preventing
the dissemination of materially misleading financial statements and
with proper application of GAAP and Generally Accepted Auditing
Standards ("GAAS"). The other is the SEC, which governs the accu-
rate disclosure of information. Although federal securities laws permit
the SEC to define the term "independence,"13 the SEC has failed to
give a definite meaning.14 Instead, the Commission instituted a two-
prong approach to determine auditor independence: the auditor
must remain independent in fact and in appearance. 15
The accounting profession, overseen by the AICPA, also promul-
gates its own standards to which its members must adhere.' 6 Account-
ants must perform audits according to GAAS applying GAAP. 17 In
addition, in February of 1998, the SEC and AICPA created the Inde-
12. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (1999); see also Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2; Final
Rule: Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, Release No.
33,7919 (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 240 (2001)), available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/final/33-7919.htm [hereinafter Release No. 33,7919].
13. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (1999) (last amended in 1983); see also Release No.
33,7870, supra note 2, at *1.
14. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (b) (1999); see also Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *3.
"The Commission will not recognize any certified public accountant or public accountant
as independent who is not in fact independent." Id. The statute continues to give genera-
lized examples illustrating when an auditor is not independent. See id. In the rule proposal,
the Commission defined the role of the independent auditor as approaching "each audit
with professional skepticism and [having] a willingness and freedom to decide issues in an
unbiased and objective manner, even when the auditor's decisions may be against the in-
terests of management of an audit client." Id.
15. See Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at *3. The first prong, independence in
fact, is "direct evidence of the auditor's mental state." Id. The second and more significant
prong, independence in appearance, "recognizes that generally mental states can be as-
sessed only through observation of external facts; it thus provides that an auditor is not
independent if a reasonable investor, with knowledge of all relevant facts and circum-
stances, would conclude that the auditor is not capable of exercising objective and impar-
tial judgment." Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at **3-4 (citing the AICPA Codification
of Statements on Auditing Standards ("SAS") No. 1, AU § 220-01-02 (1988); PUBLIC OVER-
SIGHT BOARD, SCOPE OF SERVICES BY CPA Fii.Ms (1979); United States v. Arthur Young &
Co., 465 U.S. 805, 819 n.15 (1984) in support of this proposition).
16. See About AICPA, available at http://www.aicpa.org/about/index.htm (last modi-
fied June 22, 2001).
17. See PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, THE PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2000), at App. A [hereinafter PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS].
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pendence Standards Board'8 ("ISB") to foster timely, thorough, and
open debate regarding auditor independence and to suggest improve-
ments. 19 Because accountants play a crucial role in the SEC's function
of promoting accurate disclosure of financial information, their pro-
fession is strictly regulated.
In early November 2000, the SEC finalized its proposal for the
new auditor independence rule.20 Under this rule, audit firms are
prohibited from providing almost all non-audit services because doing
so allegedly threatens auditor independence. 2' Most importantly, le-
gal services were included in the group of proscribed services. 22 The
SEC's inclusion of legal services in the rule is hurried and without
support. The new rule is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive and
does not provide for auditor independence as efficiently as possible.
Part I of this Comment discusses the background of auditor indepen-
dence and how the parties involved interact. Part II analyzes the new
rule governing auditor independence which bans legal services from
the repertoire of audit firms. Part III illustrates how, on four different
levels, the SEC's reactionary policy toward the legal services provided
by audit firms is unfounded. This Comment concludes that the SEC
prematurely wrote its new auditor independence rule without fully ex-
amining the issue and explains the consequences of the new rule.
I. Background
A. The Impetus for Disclosure Requirements
The Great Depression of 1929 served as the major catalyst for the
reform of accounting standards and securities law.23 Before the stock
market crash, companies were required to have their financial infor-
mation prepared by independent accountants. However, companies
18. See Policy Statement: The Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related
to Auditor Independence, Release No. 33,7507 (February 18, 1998), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/concept/33-7507.htm [hereinafter Release No. 33,7507]. In July 2001,
the SEC amended FRR-50 and decided that it would no longer look to the ISB for gui-
dance on auditor independence issue. See id.; see also Commission Policy Statement on the
Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related to Auditor Independence, Release
No. 33,7993 (July 17, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-7993.htm
[hereinafter Release No. 33,7993].
19. See About the ISB, available at http://www.cpaindependence.org (last visited Feb. 1,
2001).
20. See Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12.
21. See id. at *1.
22. See id. at **59-60.
23. See Susan B. Schwab, Note, Bringing Down the Bar: Accountants Challenge Meaning of
Unauthorized Practice, 21 CAGDozo L. REv. 1425, 1438 n.70 (2000).
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did not have to provide their entire financial positioning to the pub-
lic.24 The discrepancy in information created an opportunity to mis-
lead investors since the financial statements only described a part of
the financial stability of the company.25 Although the economic con-
dition of both the United States and the rest of the world significantly
contributed to the 1929 Wall Street crash, the impact from the num-
ber of fraudulently floated securities26 in the United States cannot be
underestimated. 27
After the Depression, changes to financial reporting require-
ments focused on, among other things, increasing disclosure require-
ments, filing specified periodic reports, disclosing material facts in
proxy statements, and restricting insider trading. 28 These changes
were intended to make a company's financial position more transpar-
ent to the investor.29 The new rules also mandated that public entities
supply fuller disclosures of hard information," ° but continued to pro-
hibit the release of soft information.31 In this effort to protect inves-
tors from subjective opinions of auditors, the SEC allowed only
objective information to reach the investor by regulating the auditor's
reports. 32
In the late 1970s, the Commission realized the potential useful-
ness of soft information for investors.33 The SEC determined that in-
vestors were unlikely to be misled by auditor opinions, and might, in
fact, be aided by access to additional information. Thus, the SEC be-
gan to relax some of its strict disclosure requirements and allowed
companies to describe their financial statements when filing reports. 34
Around the same time, Congress, the SEC, and several account-
ing associations became concerned with the erosion of auditor inde-
24. See id. at 1438.
25. See id. "[Financial statements] are but the skin of a living thought and subject to
great misinterpretation as to their import for the future." Id. at 1438 n.69 (quoting TedJ.
Fiflis, ACCOUNTING ISSUES FOR LAwYERs 519 (1991) (citations omitted)).
26. The term "float" means "issu[ing] [a security] for sale on the market." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 653 (7th ed. 1999).
27. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS & LIMITED LIA-
BILITY COMPANIES, at 331-32 (6th ed. 1998).
28. See Schwab, supra note 23, at 1438-39 n.70.
29. See id.
30. The term "hard information" refers to information based on past events or facts,
e.g., prior financial position, etc. See id. at 1439 n.71.
31. The term "soft information" includes opinions, predictions, and subjective evalua-
tions. See id. at 1439 n.72.
32. See id. at 1439.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 1439-40.
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pendence and wanted to return to stricter audit standards.35 As a
result, from 1978 until 1982, the SEC required companies to disclose
all non-audit services provided by their auditors in their proxy state-
ments. 36 Companies were also required to state the percentage of the
fees for all non-audit services compared to total audit fees; the per-
centage of the fee for each non-audit service compared to total audit
fees; and include a statement as to whether each non-audit service was
considered and approved by the audit committee of the board of di-
rectors or by the board itself.3 7
The Public Oversight Board 38 ("POB") determined that provid-
ing audits and non-audit services, collectively called consulting,39 were
fundamentally incompatible. 40 This determination was based on the
theory that an auditor had to be objective, i.e., not have a financial
stake in the company which she was auditing, and that by providing
consulting services, the collection of additional fees would engender
bias and result in skewed financial reports. 4' However, when the SEC
determined that auditors and their firms were not providing the
amount of non-audit services as previously believed, the proxy require-
ment was discontinued.42
35. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *5.
36. The SEC proxy requirement stated:
[S] hareholders of a company whose securities are registered under Section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 receive a proxy statement prior to a share-
holder meeting, whether an annual or special meeting. The information con-
tained in the statement must be filed with the SEC before soliciting a shareholder
vote on the election of directors and the approval of other corporate action. So-
licitations, whether by management or shareholders, must disclose all important
facts about the issues on which shareholders are asked to vote.
SEC's Search Key Topics, availabe at http://www.sec.gov/answers/proxy.htm. See also Office
of the Chief Accountant of the United States, SEC, STAFF REPORT ON AUDITOR INDEPEN-
DENCE (1994).
37. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *8.
38. The POB is an independent, private-sector body that monitors and reports on the
self-regulatory programs and activities of the SEC Practice Section of CPA (Certified Public
Accountant) Division of the AICPA. See PANEL ON AUDIT EFFEcrVENESS, supra note 17, at
vii.
39. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *5. Non-audit services include legal ad-
vice and human resources, which are collectively referred to as consulting. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at *8 n.7.
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B. The Present Controversy over Auditor Independence
After this experimental period, accounting firms began a signifi-
cant crossover into non-audit services and consulting. 43 In recent
years, the extent to which audit firms have provided non-audit services
has skyrocketed.44 Accounting firms currently generate more revenue
from the consulting branch of the firm than from the auditing
branch, causing suspicion regarding the independence of auditors. 45
This development awakened the SEC, which was dormant on the is-
sue, into increasing regulation of the auditing industry.46
The SEC fears auditing firms will be unduly influenced by
money.47 That the bulk of their revenues are derived from consulting
suggests auditing firms and auditors are less objective in auditing their
clients' companies because they will try to sell consulting services to
their clients, thereby generating more profit for the firm. Arguably,
auditors will not objectively evaluate the company, but rather will
make recommendations that financially benefit the auditing firm. 48
Concerns over auditor independence grew so strong that a num-
ber of organizations formed panels to objectively explore the issue.49
In October 1998, the POB appointed the Panel on Audit Effectiveness
("the Panel") at the request of then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt.50
The impetus for the Panel's report was the increasing pressure on cor-
porate management to achieve earnings or other performance
targets.51 The SEC believed that in "succumbing to those pressures,
43. See Michael Schroeder, SEC, Accounting Firms Reach Pact on Conflicts, WALL ST. J.,
June 8, 2000, at A2.
44. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *5 (noting the SEC found that in 1999,
approximately half of the Big Five's revenue came from consulting). See also PANEL ON
AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17, at 112.
45. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *6.
46. See id. at *5.
47. See id. at **6-7.
48. See id. at *6.
49. See EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH & COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES IN-
DEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD: RESEARCH INTO PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
AND OBJECTIVITY-PHASE II (Jul. 2000) (exploring the perceptions of auditor indepen-
dence by those involved with auditors and accounting firms). The report noted some con-
cern about auditor independence, but overall the impression was positive. See id. at 6-7. See
also INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD, DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM DM 99-4 (Dec. 1999) (dis-
cussing the advantages and disadvantages of banning legal services and recommending
safeguards for auditor independence). The American Bar Association, the professional
body which governs the legal field, had its own commission formed to investigate the topic.
See discussion infra pp. 14-18.
50. See PANEL ON AUDIT EFFEcrtVENESS, supra note 17, at 1.
51. See id. at vii.
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management's behavior can become suspect."52 Furthermore,
changes in technology were cited as increasing efficiency but decreas-
ing effectiveness of audits, raising concerns about the relative finan-
cial importance of audits to auditing firms. 53 The SEC requested that
the Panel conduct a thorough and objective examination of the audit-
ing process, specifically exploring potential threats to auditor inde-
pendence. 54 After almost two years of study, the Panel gave favorable
reviews of the auditing profession, concluding that as long as indepen-
dence standards were maintained, no drastic measures were needed
with respect to non-audit services.55 The Panel simply suggested that
the SEC continue to monitor the effectiveness of the then-current ISB
disclosures and audit committee disclosure requirements. 56
Despite the Panel's favorable reviews and conclusions, a few
highly publicized scandals increased pressure on regulatory agencies
to address the issue of non-audit services. One such fiasco involved
PricewaterhouseCoopers, a Big Five firm, 57 in which the SEC reported
8,064 auditor independence violations.58 The responsible parties in-
cluded thirty-one top partners and six executives responsible for en-
forcing independence rules.59 Ten of the employees were terminated
as a result of the scandal. 60 Aside from the incident involving Price-
waterhouseCoopers, no other major problems have surfaced at the
other Big Five firms. 61 Nevertheless, still suspecting undetected viola-
tions, on June 7, 2000, the SEC and the Big Five agreed to a "look
back" audit, which allowed the SEC to investigate the firms for past
violations, in exchange for immunity from prosecution for any viola-
tions found.62 However, in January 2001, the SEC rescinded its offer
52. Id.
53. See id. at viii.
54. See id. at vii.
55. See id. at ix.
56. See id. at 117.
57. See id. at 182 (explaining that the "Big Five" refers to the five largest accounting
firms: Deloitte & Touche LLP, KPMG LLP, Arthur Anderson LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP).
58. See Elizabeth MacDonald, Top Accounting Industry Group Sets Conflict-of-Interest Com-
pliance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2000, at B2 (noting that the majority of these violations
were auditors and their families improperly investing in audit clients).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Big Accounting Firms Agree to SEC 'Look Back' Audit, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2000, at
C15 (observing that most of the violations found were of the improper investment variety).
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of amnesty to the auditing firms because it feared being forced into
giving amnesty to those who refused to comply. 63
The American Bar Association ("ABA") and many state bar as-
sociations have regulations, similar to the SEC's, which prohibit law-
yers from sharing profits with non-lawyers. 64  Since auditor
independence affects lawyers as well, the ABA formed the Commis-
sion on Multidisciplinary Practice 65 in August 1998 to study the busi-
ness phenomenon. 66 A year later, the commission recommended the
ABA amend its ethical rules to allow firms to offer both legal and non-
legal services, as long as lawyers had the control and authority neces-
sary to assure lawyer independence. 6 7 After the presentation of the
recommendation, the ABA's House of Delegates declined to support
any changes in the ethical standards. 68 In May 2000, the ABA's Com-
mission on Multidisciplinary Practice renewed its proposal and, again,
it was rejected.69 The tension between the two stances raises questions
as to whether the legal profession is attempting to influence the
SEC.70
63. See Independence, PARTNER'S REPORT FOR CPA Fim OWNERS, Jan. 2001, at 6, availa-
ble at 2001 WL 17740271.
64. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, MDP Information (Feb. 5, 2001),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstate_summ.html. The chart found on the
website illustrates that approximately fifty percent of the state bar associations are studying
the issue of allowing lawyers to work in conjunction with accounting firms. Id.
65. The ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice defines multidisciplinary
practice ("MDP") as "[a] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or
entity that includes lawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal
services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out as providing nonle-
gal, as well as legal services." ABA-Young Lawyers Division, Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice: The FAQs on MDPs, available at http://www.abanet.org/yld/tyl/nov99/
newtoyou.html (Nov. 1999).
66. See id.; see also Bower, supra note 4, at 62.
67. See ABA News Release, ABA Commission Renews Proposal for Multidisciplinary Practice,
available at http://www.abanet.org/media/mar00/mdp.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
68. SeeJohn S. Dzienkowski & RobertJ. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the Ameri-
can Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-
First Century, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 86-87.
69. See id. at 86-87; see also ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the
House of Delegates (Jul. 2000).
70. Two other legal professional organizations spoke out on the issue. The National
Lawyers Association strongly opposed Multidisciplinary Practices. See Nat'l Law. Ass'n, Com-
ments to MDPs (Dec. 22, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/farnan.html. In
contrast, the International Bar Association ("IBA") expressed an interest in protecting cli-
ent and public interest. See Bower, supra note 4, at 62. The IBA communicated its position
to the World Trade Organization ("W1TO"), which is strongly opposed to any sort of eco-
nomic regulations. Thus, is it reasonable to conclude that MDPs are tacitly accepted on the
global scale. See id.
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Controversy has been brewing not only over the content of the
new auditor independence rule, but also over the process by which it
was created. Ernst & Young and PricewaterhouseCoopers initially in-
vited scrutiny of and revisions to auditor independence rules, but then
began to resent it. They argued that the proposed changes went too
far, were too prohibitory and uncertain, and like the proxy disclosures
of twenty years ago, will soon be unnecessary.71 Further suspicions
arose when the SEC delegated all independence issues to the ISB, rais-
ing the question of whether the SEC had jurisdiction to promulgate
new independence standards.72 These firms also complained that the
public hearings on the proposed rule were not neutral and favored
the SEC, which primarily invited proponents of the rule and offered a
skewed discussion. 73
II. The Statute
On June 27, 2000, the Commission announced the proposed74
regulations, which aimed at modernizing the rules for auditor inde-
71. See Floyd Norris, A top accounting executive asks the S.E. C to amend a new proposal on
auditor independence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at C8. While Ernst & Young and Price-
waterhouseCoopers initially supported the proposed rule, KPMG, Arthur Anderson and
Deloitte & Touche opposed the changes from the start. Id.
72. See Hearing Testimony: Auditor Independence, Release No. 33,7870 (Sept. 13,
2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/audmin2.htm [hereinafter Hearing
Testimony Day 2] (testimony of Robert K Elliott, Chairman, AICPA) (asserting that the
SEC's proposal to modify the rules circumvents the ISB and is contrary to Financial Report-
ing Release 50, which delegates authority on independence issues to the ISB). The ISB
issue will not be addressed in this Comment.
73. See Tamara Loomis, SEC Faces Stiff Opposition in Proposal for Guidelines, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 14, 2000, at 5 (describing the resistance of the Big Five to the SEC's proposed auditor
independence rule).
74. Rulemaking is the process where federal administrative agencies implement legis-
lation passed by Congress. See How the SEC Rulemaking Process Works, available at bttp://www.
sec.gov/asec/wwwsec.htm (last modified Aug. 8, 2000). Specifically, the authority of the
SEC, as an administrative agency, to enact new regulations is granted by the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934. See id. The Acts serve as a general framework for the securities markets
allowing for evolution of those markets and of rules used to regulate them. See id. In
rulemaking, there are three major steps: concept release, rule proposal, and rule adoption.
See id. A concept release simply describes the issue in general terms and often involves
public comment. The concept release is not a necessary step and is often omitted if the
subject is fairly straightforward. See id. The release then evolves into the rule proposal, a
formal detailed document, which is then presented to the full Commission. See id. Follow-
ing an approval by the Commission, the rule is presented to the public for comment dur-
ing a specified period of time, usually between thirty and sixty days. Finally, after hearing
public comment, the final rule is drafted and presented to the Commission for its consid-
eration. See id. If the Commission adopts it, the rule becomes part of the official body of
regulations that govern the securities industry. See id. If the new rule is controversial, it may
be subject to congressional review and veto prior to becoming effective. See id.
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pendence in three general areas:75 "(1) investments by auditors or
their family members in audit clients; (2) employment relationships
between auditors or their family members and audit clients; and (3)
the scope of the services provided by the audit firms to their audit
clients."
76
A. The New Rule Regulating Auditor Independence
The SEC listed several developments in the accounting profes-
sion which, in its opinion, compromise auditor independence, and
thus, necessitated the reforms. 77 Primarily, the SEC was concerned
that the percentage of revenue derived from audits was dwindling and
being replaced by consulting revenues. 78 The SEC also questioned
whether the previous independence standards were appropriate given
the financial market's new emphasis on strategic alliances, mergers,
and advances in technology. 79 The SEC noted that economic and bus-
iness environments changed so drastically that the old auditor inde-
pendence provisions were no longer effective.80
75. See Floyd Norris, SEC Proposes Stricter Accounting Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at
Cl.
76. The Commission's Proposal To Modernize the Rules Governing the Independence of the Ac-
counting Profession, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/audfact.htm (last modified
June 27, 2000).
77. See PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 17, at 112.
78. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *2.
79. Specifically, the SEC stated:
[F]irms are becoming primarily business advisory service firms as they increase
the number, revenues from, and types of non-audit services provided to audit
clients[;] firms and their audit clients are entering into an increasing number of
business relationships, such as strategic alliances, co-marketing arrangements,
and joint ventures[;] firms are divesting significant portions of their consulting
practices or restructuring their organizations[;] firms are offering ownership of
part of their practices to the public, including audit clients[;] firms are in need of
increased capital to finance the growth of consulting practices, new technology,
training, and large unfunded pension obligations[;] firms have merged, resulting
in increased firm size, both domestically and internationally[;] firms have ex-
panded into international networks, affiliating and marketing under a common
name[;] non-CPA financial service firms have acquired accounting firms, and the
acquirors previously have not been subject to the profession's independence, au-
diting, or quality control standards[;] firms' professional staffs have become more
mobile, and geographical location has become less important due to advances in
telecommunications and internet services[;] and audit clients are hiring an in-
creasing number of firm partners, professional staff, and their spouses for high
level management positions.
Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *2.
80. See id. at *4.
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The amended regulations were based on four general scenarios
in which the Commission believed an accountant could not be inde-
pendent."' These circumstances occur when the auditor "(i) has a mu-
tual or conflicting interest with the audit client, [82] (ii) audits the
accountant's own work, [83] (iii) functions as management or an em-
ployee of the audit client, [84] or (iv) acts as an advocate [85] for the
audit client."86 These broad definitions essentially allowed the Com-
mission to ban non-audit services.
The SEC expected to prevent future problems by eliminating the
ability of audit firms to provide non-audit services-most importantly
legal services.8 7 Among the other services proscribed 88 were: book-
keeping,8 9 financial information systems design, 9°1 appraisal or valua-
tion services,9 ' actuarial services, 92 internal audit outsourcing, 93
81. See id. at *2.
82. An example of such mutual interest is an auditor investing in the company which
he or she was auditing.
83. An example of this is bookkeeping, where the accountant would prepare and
maintain financial records and the auditor of the same firm would verify those records.
84. Here, the auditor becomes in effect part of the decisional force of the client com-
pany and has an opportunity to affect the fate of the client company rather than simply
being an inspector of financial records.
85. See Hearing Testimony Day 2, supra note 72, at *31 (Sept. 13, 2000) (testimony of
Nancy LaMata, N.Y. Society of CPAs). The intent was to ban legal services from accounting
firms' consulting services. See Hearing Testimony: Auditor Independence, Release No.
33,7870 (July 26, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gove/rules/extra/audmin.htm at *9
[hereinafter Hearing Testimony Day 1] (testimony of J. Michael Cook, former Chairman
of Deloitte & Touche) (arguing that many opponents of the ban believe that "advocacy"
had too far-reaching effects and that a more narrow definition should be used). See also
Hearing Testimony: Auditor Independence, Release No. 33,7870, *79 (Sept. 20, 2000),
available at http://www.sec.gov.rules/extra/audmin3.htm [hereinafter Hearing Testimony
Day 3] (testimony of Ronald Nielsen, Iowa Accountancy Examiners Board).
86. Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *45. These four ideals are listed in paragraph
(b) of the proposed rule.
87. See id. at *6.
88. See Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at **112-16.
89. Bookkeeping is defined as any service involving maintaining or preparing a com-
pany's financial records. See id. at *112. Thus, the auditor would be essentially checking his
or her own work.
90. Financial information systems design involves designing or implementing a hard-
ware or software system which is significant to the client company's financial statements as
a whole. See id.
91. Appraisal or valuation services involve any service requiring a fairness opinion
where the results are likely to be audited by an accountant. See id. at *113.
92. Actuarial service is any advisory service involving the determination of policy
reserves and related accounts. See id. at 113-14.
93. Internal audit outsourcing consists of the accounting firms conducting audits of
client company's internal operations and systems. See id. at **114-15.
[Vol. 36
management functions, 94 human resources,9 5 broker-dealer or invest-
ment banking services,9 6 and expert services.97
The proposed rule, which is more detailed than the previous au-
ditor independence rule, lists each banned non-audit service. 98 The
prior introductory sentence was largely retained but the statute was
then broken down into many specific subparts. The ban on legal ser-
vices reads, in pertinent part:
(c) [a] n accountant is not independent under the standard of par-
agraph (b) [99] of this section if, during the audit and professional
engagement period, the accountant has any of the financial, em-
ployment or business relationships with, provides any of the non-
audit services to, or receives a contingent fee from, the account-
ant's audit client or an affiliate of the audit client, as specified in
paragraphs (c) (1) through (c) (5) of this section, or otherwise does
not comply with the standard of paragraph (b) of this section
.... (4) (I) Legal services. Providing any service to an audit client or
an affiliate of an audit client that, in the jurisdiction in which the
service is provided, could be provided only by someone licensed to
practice law. 100
The SEC considered a blanket ban on all non-audit services, but
eventually rejected the idea.10 1 Instead the SEC's proposed rule on
auditor independence evolved into broad and generalized categories
of non-audit services to be proscribed.
94. Management functions occur when an employee of the accounting firm tempora-
rily acts as a director, officer, or employee of the client company and performs any deci-
sion-making or supervisory role. See id. at *115.
95. Human resources includes recruiting, hiring, or designing compensation pack-
ages or tests for directors, officers, or managers of an audit client. See id.
96. Broker-dealer or investment banking services consist of acting as a securities pro-
fessional and analyzing an audit client's securities and investments. See id.
97. Expert services are defined as rendering or supporting any expert opinion for an
audit client in administrative or regulatory filings or proceedings. See Release No. 33,7870,
supra note 2, at *48.
98. See id.
99. Paragraph (b) of the proposed rule stated:
The Commission will not recognize an accountant as independent, with respect
to an audit client, if the accountant is not, or would not be perceived by reasona-
ble investors to be, capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment on all
issues encompassed within the accountant's engagement. Under this standard, an
accountant is not independent whenever, during the audit and professional en-
gagement period, the accountant: (1) [h]as a mutual or conflicting interest with
the audit client; (2) [a]udit's the accountant's own work; (3) [f]unctions as man-
agement or an employee of the audit client; or (4) [a]cts as an advocate for the
audit client.
Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, *45.
100. Id. at **45, 48; see also 17 CFR § 210.2-01(c) (4)(i) (I) (1999).
101. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *7.
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After four rounds of public hearings, the Commission revised the
proposed rule and gained some support from the Big Five firms as a
result of several compromises-compromises which included provid-
ing legal services. 102 The SEC adopted "the broader [phrase] 'admit-
ted to practice before the courts of a United States jurisdiction"' 0 3
instead of the more restrictive "someone licensed to practice the
law."' 0 4 The new rule states:
(b) The Commission will not recognize an accountant as indepen-
dent, with respect to an audit client, if the accountant is not, or a
reasonable investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and cir-
cumstances would conclude that the accountant is not, capable of
exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues encom-
passed within the accountant's engagement . . . . (c) This para-
graph sets forth a non-exclusive specification of circumstances
inconsistent with paragraph (b) of this section .... (4) . . . An
accountant is not independent if, at any point during the audit and
professional engagement period, the accountant provides the fol-
lowing non-audit services to an audit client: ... (ix) Legal services.
Providing any service to an audit client under circumstances in
which the person providing the service must be admitted to prac-
tice before the courts of a United States jurisdiction. 10 5
The effect of this change in language is to prevent easy evasion
through advocating with permission of the court and to maintain sig-
nificant hurdles for accounting firms. This "phrase [also] appears to
loosen restrictions on the Big Five's international endeavors.", 0 6 The
agreement on legal services has been met with mixed reactions. Sup-
porters of the rule say that it will allow accounting firms to expand
their law-related services, especially in an international context.10 7
They claim that the SEC declined to adopt restrictive definitions of
the terms "legal services" and "affiliate"-the former to allow expan-
sion of domestic activities, and the latter to allow for joint ventures in
legal services abroad. 10 On the other hand, critics of the rule perceive
it as providing broader prohibitions. 09
Other minor adjustments included the decisions not to ban ex-
pert services under the non-audit services category and to mandate
102. See generally William R. McLucas & Paul R. Eckert, The Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's Revised Auditor Independence Rules, 56 Bus. LAw. 877 (2001).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at **107-15.
106. Geanne Rosenberg, SEC's new rules will likely allow Big Five to expand legal services,
NAT'L L.J., at B7 (Dec. 4, 2000).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See McLucas & Eckert, supra note 102, at 909.
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the use of proxy statements to disclose consulting information.' 10 The
Commission unanimously adopted the proposed rule on November
15, 2000.111
B. The SEC's Arguments in Support of the Final Rule
In the text accompanying both the proposed and final rules, the
SEC bolsters its position with two general arguments. The first argu-
ment is that the auditor becomes vulnerable to economic pressure
from audit clients in certain situations.1 2 The SEC believes account-
ant objectivity is nearly impossible to achieve when there is a commit-
ment to many large, non-audit engagements. 113 It contends that
American capital markets are vibrant because the public is confident
the information they receive is whole, unbiased, and accurate. 14 This
confidence begets a willingness to invest because the public is certain
it is making a fully informed decision to invest in a solid company. In
the economy's current climate of risky ventures and start-ups, the
Commission feels the need for full disclosure is greater than ever.' 1 5
The SEC presumes that there must be a rule to guard the profession-
alism of accountants who may be unduly influenced by fluctuations of
the market. 16
Weaved into this first argument is the Commission's concern
about the change in sources of revenue for accounting firms. It esti-
mates that only thirty percent of revenue is derived from auditing ser-
vices. 117 The Commission and its proponents fear that accounting
firms have been using auditing services as part of a "loss leader"
scheme, in which the client is pulled in with audit services, a process
required by SEC regulations, and then sold superfluous and costlier
non-audit services." i8 The SEC fears that in order for the accounting
110. See id.
111. See McLucas & Eckert, supra note 102, at 877.
112. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at **6-7; Release No. 33,7919, supra note
12, at **9-12.
113. See Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at **9-12.
114. See Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Seeks Increased Scrutiny and New Rules for Account-
ants, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2000, at Cl.
115. See Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at **2-3.
116. See Laurie Hatten-Boyd, Ebbs and Tides and Water Rise- What's the Real Concern with
MDPs?, 53 TAX LAw. 489, 492 (2000).
117. See Morgenson, supra note 114, at 11.
118. See Dave Dasgupta, Editorial, Don't Let Big Five End Run the SEC, WALL ST. J., July 6,
2000, at A27 (stating the issue of audit services being used as a loss leader was also thor-
oughly discussed at the Public Hearings before the Commission). The view on the loss
leader concept with respect to accounting firms is somewhat disjointed. Recently, SEC
Chief Accountant Turner stated that audits as loss leaders is a myth, speculating that ac-
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firm to obtain consulting fees, the auditors may not conduct them-
selves as rigorously as they would otherwise. 19 Thus, the so-called
"mutuality of interest" interferes with the accuracy and unbiased per-
spective of the auditor.120
The second general argument the SEC proffers is that there are
independence issues inherent in the nature of certain non-audit ser-
vices. 121 The Commission and the proponents of the Rule claim that a
ban on non-audit services is necessary to protect investors. 122 The ba-
sic duty of an auditor is to present a neutral financial picture, while
the duty of a lawyer is to advocate for his or her client. Supporters of
the Rule claim the idea of auditors and lawyers working under one
roof presents fundamental inconsistencies that cannot be recon-
ciled.' 23 They argue that lawyers employed by accounting firms can-
not be trusted to provide competent and conflict-free representation,
thereby adversely affecting the objective accuracy of the audits.' 24
Supporters of the Rule also view confidentiality as another area
where lawyers and auditors cannot work together. 25 They argue that
tension arises from the differences between the "core values" of a law-
yer, such as privilege, professional standards, and ethical require-
ments, and those of an auditor. 26 For example, while discussions
between a lawyer and her client are protected, 127 the same informa-
tion given to an auditor must be disclosed. 28
As an example of compromised auditor independence, the Com-
mission cites a company hiring its audit firm to perform valuations of
counting firms use this perception to leverage prices for higher-margin business. See CPA
Fees Source: Accounting Office Management & Administration Report, CFO, CONTROLLER'S RE-
PORT, Feb. 2001, at 6, available at 2001 WL 18273729. However, it is claimed that the Chief
Accountant had little or no support to back this allegation. See id. Again, auditing firms are
quick to reject the loss leader theory, admitting that they make money on audits. See id.
119. See id.
120. Michael Schroeder & Judith Burns, Levitt Seeks Rules to Curb Audit Firms' Conflicts,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 2000, at A2 (noting that SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner, con-
cerned about accounting firms mixing consulting and auditing, stated, "[a]udit firms
should not be part of a web of business relationships that gives them a mutuality of finan-
cial interest with an audit client.").
121. See Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at *12.
122. See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinay Practice: Their
Deviation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. Rv.
1115, 1144-45 (2000); see also Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at *4.
123. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *24.
124. See id.
125. See Green, supra note 122, at 1144-45; Kostant, supra note 4, at 50-51.
126. See Green, supra note 122, at 1144-48.
127. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 50-51.
128. See id.
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in-process research and development. 129 The SEC claims that in this
situation, the audit firm is responsible not to the public, but to the
company's management.130 It can be assumed that the decisions are
being made to please management, which jeopardizes the auditor's
independence and his duties to the public. The SEC attempts to avoid
this tension through the amendment of the auditor independence
regulations.
III. Analysis and Criticism
This Comment focuses on the SEC position that an auditor can-
not be independent when he provides legal services for his client. 31
This assumption has the potential to do far more harm than good,
and the SEC should consider less intrusive regulations. The SEC is
wrong to compare the independence-threatening characteristics of
other prohibited non-audit services with those of legal services. This
position views the lawyer one-dimensionally, solely capable of acting as
an advocate; however, in contemporary commercial settings, lawyers
play many roles. Further, legal services do not share the same qualities
as the other non-audit services. For example, in non-audit services
such as bookkeeping or management functions, the auditor becomes
involved in the functioning of the client company. The lawyer, on the
other hand, offers advice but cannot make final decisions for the cli-
ent. Given the differences between the two types of non-audit services,
legal services and other non-audit services should be treated differ-
ently by the SEC.
In addition, the auditor independence rule will likely touch every
accounting firm or partnership in the country, since many state ac-
counting boards have indicated that they will adopt the amended SEC
regulations. 32 This is not an issue which promises to affect solely the
Big Five accounting firms.' 33 The smaller auditing and accounting
firms believe they will be significantly impacted by the SEC's new rule,
129. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *2.
130. See id.
131. Some observers have commented that the legal field's proscription of fee sharing
and the like, are an attempt to preserve lawyers' monopoly of the field. See Green, supra
note 122, at 1129; see also Gary A. Munneke, A Nightmare on Main Street (Pail MXL): Freddie
Joins an Accounting Firm, 20 PACE L. REv. 1, 15-16 (1999); Schwab, supra note 23, at 1432
n.37.
132. See Partner's Report for CPA Firm Owners, at http://www.accountingweb.com (last
modified Nov. 9, 2000).
133. See id.
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even though they do not serve any SEC registered clients.1 34 They are
also concerned that the comment period is too short to sufficiently
delve into the potential consequences of the Rule and are troubled by
the lack of empirical evidence supporting the SEC's position. 35 Small
accounting firms estimate that profits will decrease for both them and
their small business clients, and thus they will be forced to cut up to
fifty percent of their workforce; they are also concerned that the Rule
will adversely impact their ability to recruit new talent.1 36
Unfortunately, the SEC is not willing to fully consider the ramifi-
cations of the new Rule. In fact, it has dismissed the concerns of
smaller accounting firms as being "so hypothetical that it's irrelevant
to our decision at this point."' 37 The SEC's obvious indifference lends
truth to allegations that the Commission is not being objective. Its two
main arguments are flimsy and are not truly faithful to its pledged
purpose of protecting the public.
A. A Rebuttal to the SEC's Claim That Economics Should Not Be
a Motivating Factor
The SEC's primary argument is that mixing the two professions-
auditing and legal services-creates an economic motive.' 3" However,
this is an unfair proposition in the modern economy which is, and
traditionally has been, driven by profit margin. When the law man-
dates a particular economic activity such as an audit, the reasons for
performing the audit are not profit driven. 39 In economic terms, the
price of a service (or its value) is a representation of the service's util-
ity or how much an individual wants or demands it. Once a particular
good or service is mandated, its value is no longer accurately reflected
in its cost because the want or demand of the individual becomes ir-
relevant. Thus, by requiring audits, the SEC has broken the economic
link between utility and cost. 1 40 It is also imprecise to compare the
134. See Hearing Testimony Day 2, supra note 72, at **72-74 (Sept. 13, 2000) (testi-
mony of Gary Shamis).
135. See id.
136. See id. at **73-74.
137. Id. at *74 (testimony of Arthur Levitt) (responding to the concerns of Gary
Shamis, who was representing the fiftieth largest accounting firm in the United States and
believed that the state of Ohio would use the SEC regulations as a benchmark for its own
independence standards).
138. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *6.
139. See Hearing Testimony Day 2, supra note 72, at **108-09 (testimony of Rajib
Doogar).
140. See id. at *108.
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revenues brought in by audits with those brought in by fees for con-
sulting-where cost more precisely reflects the service's value.
Furthermore, there is a disincentive to be honest and unbiased
when the party to be critiqued is also the party who is paying for the
service. Specifically, the fact that the paying client-company wants a
positive audit recommendation creates pressure on the auditor to de-
liver. 141 Since the audit has the potential to recur every year, versus
consulting or legal services which are no longer needed after the pro-
ject or case has been completed, this pressure is magnified.' 42 So,
even without providing non-audit services, there is a tendency for the
accounting firm to attempt to please the company it audits because of
the potential for repeat business.' 43 "[A]s long as auditing firms are
hired by their clients who can hire and fire and negotiate with them at
will, the possibility of true independence no longer exists because a
negative report has negative implications for the auditing firm as
well. 1 44 Regardless of whether non-audit services are performed, true
independence is elusive. The only way to avoid this would be to have
audits performed by public or governmental auditing firms, an idea
which has been rejected by Congress.' 45
B. Legal Services and Audits Necessarily Conflict-A Four Part
Rebuttal
The SEC's second argument in support of the new auditor inde-
pendence rules asserts that, in certain non-audit services such as legal
services, there are inherent and irreconcilable independence con-
flicts. 1 46 This rationale can be discredited by four distinct points. First,
141. See generally Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias
for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597 (2000) (claiming the self-serving bias affects
auditors as much as attorneys, but that the effect would be greater with the presence of
non-auditing services).
142. See id. at 1631-33.
143. See Hearing Testimony Day 3, supra note 85, at *27 (testimony of Robert K. Elliott)
(noting that auditing is quite profitable for accounting firms, and at the gross profit level is
the most profitable). Thus, auditors would strive to keep this lucrative relationship regard-
less of non-audit services.
144. Hearing Testimony Day 1, supra note 85, at *68 (testimony of Max H. Bazerman,
Professor, Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University); see also
Hearing Testimony Day 3, supra note 85, at *59 (testimony of Don N. Kleinmuntz, Profes-
sor of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) (stating that
"[1] imiting or restricting non-audit services will not eliminate the economic relationship").
145. See Hearing Testimony Day 3, supra note 85, at *43 (testimony of Stephen G. But-
ler, Chairman of KPMG).
146. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *7; Release No. 33,7919, supra note 12, at
*12.
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the current structure of accounting firms providing legal services is a
result of market forces and should be left alone. Second, the core
values of attorneys and accountants can be reconciled. Third, the SEC
rule as it presently defines "advocacy" is far too broad and will be diffi-
cult to enforce. Finally, other accounting models have demonstrated
that providing both auditing and legal services are not inconsistent
tasks.
1. The Current Market Structure Is Beneficial to Consumers
Among its concerns, the SEC cited the fact that the marketplace
has changed dramatically in recent years due to technical advances
and that it was unsure if auditor independence standards were still
being met.' 47 However, this concern is unfounded because market de-
mand is moving toward an area where lawyers and accountants can
work side by side for the benefit of clients. 148 Additionally, "[t]he
global economy and the Internet communication system place de-
mands on professionals that can be met only in a teaming
approach." 149
The SEC's concerns ignore the fact that the current market was
not created by the Big Five firms, but is a result of the changing con-
sumer demand for legal services. 150 Business practices have become so
complex in the modern economy that several different genres of ser-
vices, especially legal services, are required to fully comprehend the
ramifications of a single transaction. 15'
There are several consumer benefits to having accounting and
auditing firms provide non-audit services, especially legal services.
First, the client receives the advantage of an integrated team ap-
proach. 152 From the auditor's perspective, the more the auditor
knows about the company he audits, such as knowledge gained
through providing non-audit services, the more effective the audit.' 3
Conversely, the more a lawyer knows about his client, the better the
advice rendered, thereby benefiting the client through the coordina-
tion of collective knowledge. 154
147. See Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *2.
148. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 43.
149. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 123.
150. See Hatten-Boyd, supra note 116, at 507.
151. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 50.
152. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 117-18.
153. See id.
154. See id.
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Second, the pairing of lawyers and accountants results in an effi-
ciency of time and money, as well as an increase in the quality of ser-
vice.155 The client-company will save time by dealing with only one
service provider rather than several. 15 6 It will save money through the
economies of scale, where the average cost of producing a service de-
creases with increased production of that service. 157 The increase in
the quality of services results from the variety of specialized skills the
accounting firms can offer clients.15 8
Since the "establishment of MDPs will not decrease the number
of professional services firms competing for client business, but in-
stead will expand product offerings, the introduction of multidiscipli-
nary services is more likely to increase rather than decrease
competition in the market for professional services.' 1 59 Such a laissez-
faire situation would allow for the genesis of innovative services bene-
fiting the public by providing additional services, such as assisted ne-
gotiation.1 60 Experts are confident that the market, if left alone, will
self regulate and work itself out.161
2. Similarities in the Core Values of Lawyers and Accountants
Supporters of the proposed Rule argue there are inherent and
incompatible differences between the core values of a lawyer and
those of an accountant. The two areas of dispute are client privilege
and confidentiality, and ethical standards. Supporters of the proposed
Rule claim that accountants, unlike lawyers, have no privilege of confi-
dentiality to the client-since their duty is to the public, they must
disseminate any information they find to the general public. 162
155. See id. at 118-19.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 119.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 121.
160. See Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Who Is the
Bar Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REv. 599, 622 (2000); see also Ann L. MacNaughton,
Law Practice in the 21st Century: Assisted Negotiations and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving
(1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm2/mdp/macnaugl.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2001); Ann L. MacNaughton, Multidisciplinary Practice: Strategic Response to Transforma-
tion of Global Business Realty (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/lmp2/mdp/
macnaug2.html (standing for the proposition that the new global structure impacts lawyers
in two ways: (1) an increase in demand for assisted negotiation in business dispute resolu-
tion, and; (2) an expanded use of multidisciplinary cost-shared problem-solving and dis-
pute resolution models); John Gibeaut, Cash Boughs, A.B.A.J., Feb. 2001, at 50.
161. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 205.
162. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 50-51.
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However, this argument is flawed. First, AICPA Rule 301 prohibits
accountants from disclosing confidential information or attesting to
financial statements without consent.165 Thus, accountants do not
have an absolute duty to disclose all information. 164 General counsel
for a Big Five firm stated that there is "'little real conflict' between
protecting client confidences and making full disclosure in audits. 1 65
Even though legal counsel receives confidential information, the privi-
lege is not always absolute-such counsel should always advise their
client to fully disclose information to its auditors. 166 There is "an inde-
pendent duty to disclose all material information to their auditors re-
gardless of the attorney-client privilege."'167 The attorney-client
privilege also does not protect communications in furtherance of a
crime or fraud because these are not within the proper function of a
lawyer providing legal assistance. 168
Further weakening the supporters' argument, Congress enacted
an amendment to Internal Revenue Code section 7525 in 1998, which
creates a tax practitioner-client privilege. 169 Under this provision, the
same standard of confidentiality applies to certain communications
between a federally authorized tax practitioner and the client, as be-
tween attorneys and their clients. 170 "Nevertheless, the creation of this
privilege represents congressional recognition of the key role that ac-
countants and other non-lawyers who are admitted to practice before
the IRS play in tax return preparation, tax planning, and tax contro-
versy work.' 7 1
Allegations of superior ethical standards for lawyers are based on
inaccurate assumptions. 172 The traditional roles of lawyers and ac-
163. See Hatten-Boyd, supra note 116, at 498-99.
164. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 60.
165. Id. at 52.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 64.
169. See I.R.C. § 7525 (2001).
170. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 110.
171. Id.
172. See Green, supra note 122, at 1144-48 (stating that a lawyer's core values are based
on five premises: (1) lawyers are better; (2) lawyers' rules are better; (3) non-lawyers are
corrupt; (4) non-lawyers corrupt lawyers; and (5) lawyers' norms are non-negotiable); see
also Hearing Testimony Day 3, supra note 85, at *3 (testimony of Robert Elliott).
You start with a presumption or a statement that audit failures and restatements
are up and that there's something wrong with accounting. You then assume, per-
haps, that one of the reasons this might be happening is impaired independence
of accountants. And you go from there to looking at why that impairment might
exist, and you see these non-audit services which are growing and perhaps believe
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countants are quite different. The lawyer acts as both a confidential
advisor and advocate, while the accountant's "public responsibility
transcends any employment relationship with the client."'1 73 However,
this paradigm is becoming less and less true, especially in the context
of transactional lawyers dealing with corporate clients, since the main
objective of the transactional lawyer is to advise, not to advocate. 174
Although the concept of independence may not be identical for both
professions, there is no reason why lawyers in consulting or account-
ing firms cannot be held to the same standard as those employed by
traditional law firms. 175 In fact, lawyers-especially transactional law-
yers-and accountants share more similarities than many people be-
lieve. Among the parallels between the two occupations are the
governance by autonomous, self-regulating authorities, 176 the same
professional standards in SEC proceedings, 77 and relatively little
need for the attorney-client privilege in securities cases.17
3. Difficulty in Enforcement of "Advocacy"
If the SEC adopts a proscription of legal services, such a proscrip-
tion will be difficult to enforce. As written, the definition of the term
that some of those services are impairing independence, and therefore, the pro-
posing release would, essentially, cut them off.
Id.
173. Kostant, supra note 4, at 59.
174. See generally Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships
in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. Riv. 1213 (2000) (claiming the market for legal
services is changing and that corporate lawyers will play an important role in facilitating
the transition).
175. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 62.
176. See id. at 62. The self-regulation requirements are set forth by the AICPA for ac-
countants and the ABA for lawyers.
177. See id. At SEC proceedings, both lawyers and accountants have been found liable
for negligently failing to protect corporate clients from the misconduct of client managers.
Id.
178. "Commissioner Randolph, in a recent opinion, reiterated that 'neither Rule 2(e),
nor the court's recognition of it, have ever drawn distinctions between accountants and
attorneys (footnote omitted).'" Kostant, supra note 4, at 61 (arguing that corporate lawyers
practicing transactional work are "advisors" and not "advocates" and as such, are akin to
accountants. He also asserts that since SEC proceedings are non-adversarial, there is little
need for the attorney-client privilege, thus, severely weakening a key argument of the
SEC.).
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"advocacy" is entirely too broad 179 and will be open to differing
interpretations. 18 0
The definition of "advocacy" should be clarified . . . to exclude
customary auditor/client relationships which do not threaten inde-
pendence ... the normal by-products of good audit recommenda-
tions from an auditor to the client to enhance their controls,
improve the efficiency of their business, [and] lawfully minimize
the taxes they pay. 181
The prohibition assumes an organization cannot be independent
in providing legal services. In order to avoid lawyers and accountants
finding loopholes in the proposed rule, the SEC should consider
adopting a flexible principle rather than a strict ban, similar to the
prohibition on insider trading. 182 A rule based upon flexible princi-
ples will allow those charged with enforcing the auditor indepen-
dence rule to better adhere to the intent of the SEC, while avoiding
being both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.
4. Existing and Theoretical Models
There are several existing and theoretical models which have
demonstrated that providing legal services is not necessarily inconsis-
tent with auditor independence. The existing models include tax ser-
vices, the Bar Association of the District of Columbia plan, and the
Canadian and British models.183 The six theoretical models are: (1)
the cooperative model; (2) the command and control model; (3) the
ancillary business model; (4) the contract model; (5) the joint venture
model; and (6) the fully integrated model.'8 4 The fully integrated
179. See Honorable Charles L. Brieant, Is It the End of the Legal World As We Know It? 20
PACE L. REV. 21, 25 (1999).
180. See Hearing Testimony Day 2, supra note 72, at *39 (testimony of Nancy Newman
LaMata, N.Y. Society of CPAs) (stating that there may be situations where an accountant
may need to become an advocate).
181. Hearing Testimony Day 1, supra note 85, at *9 (testimony of J. Michael Cook,
former Chairman and CEO of Deloitte & Touche); see also Hearing Testimony Day 3, supra
note 85, at *79 (testimony of Ronald Nielsen, Iowa Accountancy Examining Board).
182. See DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION 616 (5th ed.
1996) (stating that Rule 1Ob-5, employed most often for insider trading violations, does not
specifically refer to or define the term "insider trading.").
183. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal
Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 243
(2000); Hatten-Boyd, supra note 116, at 500-01 (discussing the parallel between providing
tax services and providing other legal services); see also Charles C. Wolfram, LEGAL ETH-
ICS: In-house MDPs? NAT'L L. J., Mar. 6, 2000, at B6 (suggesting the Canadian model as a
solution for the United States).
184. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 153.
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model does away with the freestanding law firm.185 The benefits of
this model are the seamless provision of services and the promotion of
teamwork and cooperation.186 However, it is this model the support-
ers of the SEC's new Rule oppose.18 7
In the context of tax services, the preparer of a tax return,
whether accountant, auditor, or lawyer, is given protection equivalent
to the attorney-client privilege afforded to lawyers.18 8 In a tax setting,
courts recently recognized that the practice of law overlaps with the
practice of accounting, and have rejected the use of a rigid ap-
proach. 189 However, if Congress has concluded that a tax preparer
merits privilege, then other legal services should not be barred as in-
consistent with accounting and consulting.
The Bar Association of the District of Columbia has allowed law-
yers in a partnership to share legal fees with non-lawyers; however, it
does not permit the same freedom of services offered by accounting
and auditing firms outside of the United States.' 90 Additionally,
Model Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 requires that the sole
purpose of the partnership be to provide legal services and that non-
lawyers must adhere to the same standards of professional conduct as
lawyers.19' However, the regulation does not define or limit the voca-
tion of the non-lawyer partner. 92 The comments to the Rule refer to
several types of partnerships, including "public accountants working
in conjunction with tax lawyers or others who use accountants' ser-
vices in performing legal services." 193
Although it was expected that Washington, D.C., would become
the center for auditing and accounting firms in the United States, this
did not happen. 194 Few accounting firms have taken advantage of the
rule because the requirement that providing legal services be the sole
function of the enterprise has proved troublesome. 95 Furthermore,
firms with offices throughout the United States have found it hard to
185. See Daly, supra note 183, at 226.
186. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 171.
187. See Daly, supra note 183, at 226.
188. See Hatten-Boyd, supra note 116, at 500-01; see also Kostant, supra note 174, at
1264-65 (arguing that patent lawyers have successfully maintained high ethical standards
in a non-litigation context where both lawyers and non-lawyers can act as agents).
189. See Farrell, supra note 160, at 606-08.
190. See Daly, supra note 183, at 243.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 244.
194. See id.
195. SPee id.
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balance the Washington, D.C., rule with the total ban on non-audit
services in other states. 196
The international landscape is rapidly changing while the United
States is standing still-resisting change and the unknowns of mul-
tidisciplinary practices. 197 The United Kingdom was the first to take
steps toward approving multidisciplinary practices, allowing lawyers
and non-lawyers to work together. l98 England's solution applies the
same standard of confidentiality to international accounting firms as
to lawyers in the same position. 199 Although current rules do not allow
for fee-sharing, they do allow for close relationships between solicitors
and non-lawyers.2 00 Thus, firms are able to provide a broader range of
services, although total cooperation between the two professions is
not yet possible. 20 1 Presently, there is a movement toward permitting
solicitors to join with non-lawyers and toward permitting still stronger
alliances.202
Both Canada and Australia have followed suit.20 3 Canada allows
ownership and fee-sharing between lawyers and non-lawyers and en-
courages the adoption of rules which aid auditing and accounting
firms in providing a full range of services.20 4 Australia is considering
whether to allow law firms to incorporate, to share legal fees with non-
lawyers, and to participate in passive investment on the Australian
Stock Exchange. 2115
The initiative of Washington, D.C.'s Bar Association has sug-
gested that the sole motivation for opposing lawyers and accountants
working together is not compromised independence, but preservation
196. See id.
197. See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Updated Background and Informational Re-
port and Request for Comments, at **3-4, available at http://www.abanet.org/1 pm/mdparticle
12210_front.shtml (1999).
198. See id.; see also Michael Simmons, The Accountants Are Coming A Practical Lawyer's
Survival Kit (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/lpm2/mdp/simmonsl.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2001). For a European perspective, see Michael Simmons, Multidisciplinary
Partnerships: Who's Afraid of The Big Bad Wolf. (1998), available at http://www.abanet.org/
lpm2/mdp/simmons2.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2001).
199. See Anthony E. Davis, Multijurisdictional Practice by Transactional Lawyers-Why the
Sky Really Is Falling, PROF. LAw., Winter 2000, at 23; see also Hearing Testimony Day 2, supra
note 72, at **96-97 (testimony of Graham Ward, President of Institute of Chartered Ac-
countants in England and Wales) (suggesting that the new regulations would be in conflict
with European law).
200. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 116-17.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See Daly, supra note 183, at 116.
204. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 116.
205. See id.
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of monopoly.20 6 Prohibitions on lawyers and non-lawyers working to-
gether have significant anti-competitive effects on how demands for
legal services in the workplace are satisfied.20 7 Further, if the birth-
place of American jurisprudence finds it acceptable to allow the two
professionals to work together, the SEC must have a motive other than
auditor independence. To truly benefit the public, the Commission
should have postponed its decision regarding auditor independence
until it had evidence of violations or a better understanding of the
effects. The Commission should now retract its restrictive new Rule,
just as it did with the proxy statements in 1982.
C. What the SEC Should Have Done
Accounting firms providing more than just auditing services are a
recent phenomenon; however, they had been providing additional
services without reprimand prior to the SEC's new Rule. 20 The firms
experienced only a few compromises of auditor independence during
the period prior to the SEC's new Rule. 20 9 This makes the SEC's reac-
tion not one based on observation, but one of assumption, and thus is
without support.
The SEC outlined two major areas of concern regarding auditor
independence: economic motivation and threatened core values.
However, the SEC's fears were misplaced. Instead of reacting to
change, the SEC should have allowed more time to consider the full
ramifications of its new Rule. The SEC should have selected a fully
integrated model complemented by a transition period. The downfall
of all other models is that, without full cooperation, the benefits of
lowered costs and increases in quality of services are not realized, as
seen in the Washington, D.C., model.
Further, our economy is driven by a laissez-faire spirit. When
their entrepreneurial spark is stifled, businesses will undoubtedly
206. See Brieant, supra note 179, at 26-27, Judge Brieant discusses Judge Richard A.
Posner's view of the legal profession as being like:
other medieval guilds .... built on selfish, anti-competitive restrictions on entry
and on the conduct and pricing of the work. This view of the legal profession is as
some hulking monopoly with its feet in the Middle Ages, milking clients for the
cost of unnecessary, duplicative, and occasionally inefficient services ... and at
the same time hiding behind ethical rules that do nothing but curtail good old-
fashioned competition.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
207. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 93.
208. See Kostant, supra note 4, at 4-5.
209. See id.
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move elsewhere. 210 The SEC should take the initiative to foster, rather
than discourage, a market which includes fully integrated accounting
firms.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the SEC prematurely banned legal services from
auditing and accounting firms. The fundamental assumption made by
the SEC is wrong-that acting as a lawyer for an audit client necessi-
tates bias. In the text preceding the proposed rule, the SEC states re-
garding the ability to quantify the impairments to independence,
"[s] tudies cannot always confirm what common sense makes clear."211
In the long run, the Commission's decision will likely do more harm
than good.
210. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 68, at 205-06.
211. Release No. 33,7870, supra note 2, at *7.
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